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The caption on the cover lists all of the parties to the 
proceeding, but does not disclose the constituent members of 
Plaintiff St. Benedict's Development Company, a general 
partnership. The general partners of Plaintiff are Leon 
Peterson; Katie F. Gasser, as Trustee of the G. Walter Gasser 
Family Trust; and, GFI LTD., a Utah limited partnership with 
G. Walter Gasser as its general partner, frhe limited partners 
of GFI LTD. are the spouse, Katie F. Gasser, and four children 
of G. Walter Gasser: Kiersten, Amber, Ryan and Derek. 
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) 
pertaining to orders of any court of record over which the Utah 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the Complaint 
as a matter of law in response to motions brought by Defendants 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 
order dismissed, with prejudice, the first; two causes of action 
of the Complaint, seeking injunctive relief and damages, 
respectively. The third cause of action seeking additional 
damages was dismissed without prejudice. 
The Order of Dismissal was signed September 28, 1989, and 
filed with the District Court on September 29, 1989. The Notice 
of Appeal of Plaintiff was dated October 12, 1989, and was filed 
with the District Court on Monday, October 16, 1989. 
There are no prior or related appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The following are the issues to be determined by this 
appeal: 
1. Did the District Court err in ihaking the 
determination, exclusively as a matter of law, that both the 
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first two causes of action of the Complaint failed to state any 
actionable claim and in dismissing the same with prejudice? 
2. Did the District Court err in not considering the 
allegations of the Complaint that Defendants had breached 
specific express provisions of the contracts between Plaintiff 
and Defendant Hospital? 
3. Did the District Court err in not allowing Plaintiff 
Development Company an opportunity either to amend its Complaint 
or to pursue and obtain discovery in further support thereof 
before making the determination, exclusively as a matter of law, 
that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action for either 
injunctive relief or damages, as a result of the alleged breach 
or threatened breach of the terms and conditions, both express 
and implied, of the agreements between Hospital and Development 
Company, and in dismissing those causes of action with 
prejudice? 
4. Did the Court err in dismissing Plaintiff's Third 
Cause of Action contrary to the provisions of Rule 8 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure that only a "short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" is 
necessary? 
5. Despite the statement of the Court at the conclusion 
of oral argument on August 30, 1989 that the Court would 
consider only matters alleged in the Complaint and the law 
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pertaining thereto as set forth in the memoranda of the various 
parties, did the Court improperly consider alleged facts 
contained in arguments of counsel for defendants in both their 
written memoranda and oral arguments in arriving at the 
determination that the first two causes of action should be 
dismissed with prejudice strictly as a matter of law? 
6. What is the proper extent to which the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, which is inherent in every Utah 
contract, should or may be considered in determining whether 
conduct is prohibited by earlier written agreements and whether 
contrary conduct is actionable? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Plaintiff Development Company submits that the 
determinative provisions governing this ajjpeal are as follows: 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Claims for Relief, A pleading which sets forth a 
claim for relief, . . • shall contain (1) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment 
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
• • • 
(e) Pleadings to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, 
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concise and direct. No technical forms of 
pleading or motions are required. 
. . . 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract and for tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations. The Complaint 
was filed in June 1989, seeking injunctive relief and damages as 
a result of activity by Defendants alleged to be in violation of 
express contractual provisions and implied covenants pertaining 
thereto under leases and related agreements between Plaintiff 
and Defendant Hospital which date from the late 1970's, 
reinforced by the subsequent course of dealing between those 
parties. 
As indicated above, both Defendants filed motions to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The motions were briefed and oral argument was heard 
thereon by the Honorable David E. Roth of the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Weber County on Aiigust 30, 1989. At 
the end of the hearing, Judge Roth announced his decision from 
the bench, dismissing the first two causes of action with 
prejudice and the third cause of action without prejudice. The 
Court's written order to this effect was thereafter filed with 
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the Court on September 29, 1989. A copy thereof is found in the 
Addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FA£TS 
1. The history of this action begins with a lease dated 
July 6, 1977 ("LEASE"), entered into by Defendant St. Benedict's 
Hospital ("HOSPITAL"), as lessor, and predecessors-in-interest 
of Plaintiff St. Benedict's Development Company ("DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY") (LEASE, attached as Exhibit "A" to Complaint, Record 
at 17-23). The LEASE called for the Lessee (now Plaintiff 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY) to construct, operate and maintain a 
medical office building on land owned by ahd immediately 
adjacent to the HOSPITAL. (LEASE, Article V, Record at 17-19.) 
A nominal rent of only $1.00 (One and No/100 Dollar) is 
specified in recognition of the principle "that a building in 
operation as herein contemplated, located JLn close proximity to 
a hospital is essential to the success of the hospital." (LEASE 
at Paragraphs 2.1 and 10.1, Record at 23, $0.) 
2. The LEASE is for a period of 51 years, and provides 
for the lessee to have the option of renewing the agreement for 
two additional periods of 10 years each (L^ASE at Paragraph 1.1, 
Record at 23). The LEASE agreement restricts the various types 
of tenancies to which the building could b^ put, limiting the 
use of the leased property "for the construction, maintenance 
and operation of a medical professional building, including 
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medical suites, pharmacy, and other facilities related thereto. 
No other type of facility shall be permitted unless approved by 
lessor. M (LEASE at Paragraph 4.1, Record at 17.) Additional 
paragraphs of the LEASE further elaborate on these limitations 
(LEASE at Paragraph 10.1.B-D, Record at 20). 
3. Finally, the LEASE provides in Paragraph 5.3 that "as 
required by tenant demand, the building shall be expandable to 
approximately double its original size with the new addition 
designed to accommodate at least 14 tenants." (Record at 17.) 
4. These and other provisions of the subject LEASE are 
detailed in the allegations comprising Paragraphs 5 through 14 
of the Complaint (Record at 2-5). In fact, the provisions of 
the LEASE are incorporated by reference in the Complaint 
(Complaint at Paragraph 5, Record at 2). 
5. Paragraphs 15 through 17 of the Complaint make 
further allegations concerning the early course of dealing 
between the parties (Record at 5-6). In particular, Paragraph 
17 thereof alleges as follows: 
17. At all times from and after the execution 
of the lease dated July 6, 1977, the parties acted 
upon the express and implied condition and 
understanding that the operation of the respective 
facilities would be conducted for the mutual 
economic advantage and benefit of the parties, and 
that neither party would conduct itself in such a 
way as to cause diminution of patients of the 
hospital or tenants of the professional building or 
economic loss to the other; and each party owed the 
duty to the other to act in good faith and engage in 
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fair dealing with and toward the other in respect to 
their respective facilities. (Emphajsis added.) 
6. A follow-up agreement between HOSPITAL and Plaintiff 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY was then entered into On June 22, 1979 
(Record at 24-25). Key provisions thereof are described in 
Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Complaint, wherein the provisions of 
that agreement are incorporated by reference as evidenced by 
Exhibit "B" of the Complaint (Record at 6-7). This new 
agreement contemplated the construction by Plaintiff of an 
additional professional building adjoining the first building 
described in the LEASE. As alleged in Paragraph 18 of the 
Complaint, the fourth "WHEREAS" clause of this agreement 
provides: "[I]t is in the mutual interest of the parties to 
obtain and retain satisfactory professional tenants in the New 
Office Building." (Emphasis added.) (Record at 6, 24.) 
7. As further alleged in Paragraph 19 of the Complaint, 
the second operative provision of that agreement provides as 
follows: "The Hospital shall actively assist the Partnership in 
acquiring and holding good tenants until such time as the New 
Office Building is completely occupied." (Emphasis added.) 
(Record at 6, 24.) 
8. The HOSPITAL also agreed in Paragraph 5 of that 
agreement to "guarantee to the Partnership the performance of 
the tenants' rental obligations for one-thilrd (1/3) of the net 
leasable area of the New Office Building for each month until 
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the New Office Building is two-thirds (2/3) occupied•" (Record 
at 24.) 
9. Paragraph 6 of that agreement further affirms the 
obligation of the parties to "diligently endeavor to obtain 
lessees for the space in the New Office Building to satisfactory 
tenants who, in the normal pursuit of their professional 
practice, would refer patients to the Hospital." (Record at 
25.) 
ID. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Complaint describe events 
culminating in the execution of a replacement lease for the 
Phase II property (Record at 7). As noted in Paragraph 21 of 
the Complaint, a copy of said replacement lease was attached to 
the Complaint as Exhibit HCH, and its provisions were 
incorporated by reference therein. (Id. This replacement lease 
appears at pages 26-37 of the Record.) 
11. This replacement lease contains substantive 
provisions virtually identical to those of the original lease. 
In particular, it has the same 51-year term (Paragraph 2.1 of 
the replacement lease), the same rental of one dollar per year 
(Paragraph 3.1 of the replacement lease), the same restrictions 
on the use of the premises (Paragraphs 5.1 and 10.1 of the 
replacement lease), the same covenant that the lessee will bear 
the expense of construction (Paragraph 6.3 of the replacement 
lease), the same provisions on termination (Article VIII of the 
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replacement lease), and the same right of first refusal in favor 
of the HOSPITAL in the event of any proposed sale of the leased 
premises (Paragraph 9•1 of the replacement lease)• 
12. The Complaint, in Paragraph 25 thereof, also alleges 
the execution of another agreement between Plaintiff and 
Defendant HOSPITAL dated December 14, 1981, entitled 
"Declaration of Restrictions, Easements and Common Area 
Maintenance," a copy of which was marked as Exhibit "D" to the 
Complaint and whose provisions were incorporated therein 
(Paragraph 25 of Complaint, Record at 8). 
13. Paragraph 26 of the Complaint s^ts forth at length 
some of the declarations of mutual support contained in that 
Declaration which includes, in part, the following language from 
Paragraph E of the recitals: 
[T]he Declarants desire that their interests in each 
of the respective Parcels and any portion thereof be 
developed in conjunction with each ot}her Parcel for 
the mutual benefit of the Declarants and of each and 
all of the Parcels and every portion thereof, and 
accordingly do hereby establish a general plan for 
the improvement, protection, development, 
maintenance and use of each and all of the Parcels 
and for such purposes, Declarants do hereby 
establish easements, covenants and restrictions, 
(hereinafter collectively referred tq as 
"restrictions") as are hereinafter sOt forth, 
subject to which each of the Parcels and any portion 
thereof shall be improved, held, exchanged, leased, 
sold and/or conveyed. (Emphasis added.) 
(Record at 9-10, 39.) 
14. The primary provisions of this Declaration relate 
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to the granting and recognition of easements across HOSPITAL 
property and easements shared by the two adjoining office 
buildings constructed by Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. These 
are set forth in Articles IV and V of the Declaration, and 
include provisions, in paragraph IV.A., concerning use of 
common areas "for vehicular access, circulation and parking, 
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of patients, 
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners, 
Lessees and subtenants of the buildings constructed in the 
Development . . . ." (Record at 41). In addition, Article 
III.B. reiterates the same restrictions on use of the buildings 
as contained in the original leases, but deletes the provisions 
of the earlier leases relating to possible exceptions to the use 
of the leased area (Record at 41). 
15. The Complaint continues, in Parcigraphs 27 and 28, to 
describe the course of dealing between the Defendant HOSPITAL 
and Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (Record at 10). Then, in 
Paragraph 29, the Complaint alleges as follows: 
By reason of the foregoing, and by reason of 
the course of conduct between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Hospital, said Defendant was obligated to 
Plaintiff not to construct or permit the 
construction of additional facilities on its 
property for rental or occupancy by medical 
personnel practicing at said Hospital until such 
time as there was no more available space in 
Plaintiff's facility, and then only by offering 
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Plaintiff the opportunity to construct and provide 
such service. (Emphasis added.) 
(Record at 10-11). 
16. Following# the Complaint then sets forth the first 
cause of action at Paragraphs 30 through 37 of the Complaint, 
seeking injunctive relief for breach of contract (Record 
at 11-13). In particular, Paragraphs 31, 32 and 35 of the 
Complaint allege as follows: 
31. Notwithstanding the relationship of the 
parties, their contracts and commitments, both 
written and implied. and their long course of 
dealing and the obligation of the Defendant Hospital 
to act in good faith and deal with tjie Plaintiff 
fairly, Defendant has breached said Agreements and 
conditions and violated it's [sic] obligation to 
Plaintiff by publicly announcing the construction of 
another professional building on Defendant 
Hospital's property, adjacent to or in close 
proximity to Plaintiff's facilities, to be built by 
the Defendant The Boyer Company and |s proceeding 
with plans so to do. (Emphasis added.) 
32. Such action is designed and intended to 
deprive Plaintiff of it's [sic] tenants now 
occupying Plaintiff's professional building. At the 
present time there are five office vacancies in 
Plaintiff's professional building, aijid there are no 
reasonable sources of tenants to occupy the proposed 
facility to be build [sic] by Defendant Boyer 
Company without taking tenants from the building 
owned and operated by Plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) 
35. At the present time there %s no need for 
an additional professional building to service the 
needs of the doctors utilizing and practicing at the 
Defendant Hospital, and the construction of such a 
building will result in irreparable damage and 
injury to the Plaintiff by attracting the tenants of 
Plaintiff's building to the new building, all in 
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violation of the expressed and implied terms and 
conditions of the agreements and understandings 
previously entered into by the parties, and a breach 
of the obligations of the Defendant Hospital to deal 
with Plaintiff in good faith and fair dealing. 
(Emphas is added.) 
17. Paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Complaint comprise the 
second cause of action seeking damages for the breach of 
contract (Record at 13-14). 
18. The third cause of action of the Complaint, 
comprising Paragraphs 40-44, alleges further matters involving a 
cause of action for additional damages, for tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations (Record 
at 14-15). These include an intent to deprive Plaintiff of its 
"rights to the continued contractual relationships with tenants 
now occupying Plaintiff's professional building," and the 
solicitation of such tenants "to rent space in the proposed new 
facility and to withhold and refrain from renewing their present 
leases with Plaintiff . . . ." (Paragraph 41 of Complaint, 
Record at 14-15) . 
19. Interrogatories and document requests were served on 
Defendants with the Summons and Complaint but were never 
responded to by Defendant The Boyer Company due to the dismissal 
of the Complaint by the Court (Record at 65, 68). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The order of the lower court dismissing the Complaint is 
entitled to no deference, and all factual allegations of the 
Complaint must be accepted as true, given that this appeal is 
prosecuted from a dismissal pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The order of 
dismissal is only t;o be affirmed if it is certain that Plaintiff 
is entitled to no relief under any statement of facts which 
might be proved in support of the claim. 
Plaintiff's Complaint is more than adequate to meet the 
requirements of Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Complaint specifically identifies and incorporates by 
reference the provisions of each of the four contractual 
agreements entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant 
HOSPITAL. The Complaint also quotes at length from many of 
those contract provisions, including at least two wherein the 
HOSPITAL recognized its interest and duty to help in both 
obtaining and retaining satisfactory professional tenants. The 
Complaint alleges that there still remain vacancies in at least 
one of the buildings constructed by Plaintiff and that there is 
no other source of tenants for the new proposed facility, except 
those who are already leasing from Plaintiff. Therefore, the 
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Complaint clearly alleges breaches of the specific contractual 
provisions agreed to by Defendant HOSPITAL. 
In addition, the Complaint goes much further in noting 
many other provisions of the contracts between the parties, 
including the long-term nature of both leases and the severe 
restrictions on the use of the leased premises. The Complaint 
also addresses the course of dealing between Plaintiff and 
Defendant HOSPITAL. Careful consideration of all of these 
contractual provisions shows that the Defendant HOSPITAL has 
made an implied promise not to compete for tenants of Plaintiff 
and that if further expansion becomes necessary, that HOSPITAL 
will extend to Plaintiff the opportunity to construct and 
operate any additional professional office space. 
These conclusions are supported by long-established 
precedents, both as to the nature of the causes of action made, 
and to the effect that implied promises will be recognized where 
the conduct of the parties manifest mutual intent. 
If the Complaint fails in any material way to state one or 
more of the causes of action attempted, Plaintiff should be 
given leave to cure this defect by amendment, in accordance with 
the request of counsel for Plaintiff made at the hearing held 
August 30, 1989. Failure to allow such leave to amend, if 
needed, would be an abuse of discretion under the circumstances 
presented here, given that the motions to dismiss filed by 
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Defendants do not constitute responsive pleadings precluding 
amendment as a matter of course under Rule 15(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court may consider all alleged violations of Defendant 
HOSPITAL'S duty to use good faith and fair dealing in finding 
that the Complaint properly states causes of action, both for 
breach of contract and for tortious interference with 
prospective economic relations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT IS 
ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE. 
Because this appeal is from a dismissal pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Court must "accept the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff." Lowe v. Sorenson Research Company, Inc., 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989). Such a dismissal can be affirmed 
"only if it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff 
could not recover under the facts alleged." Id. As this Court 
has long recognized, "a complaint does not fail to state a claim 
unless ' . . .it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would 
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be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of the claim.•" Blackham v. Snelgrove, 
3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955), quoting from Leimer v. 
State Mutual Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1940). 
In such circumstances, the ruling of the lower court is 
entitled to no deference. Lowe at 668. 
II. 
THE COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY STATES CLAIMS UNDER 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The guiding light for stating legally-sufficient claims 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is found in Rule 8. 
Paragraph (a)(1) of that Rule requires only "a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief." 
Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY respectfully submits that 
its complaint is more than adequate to meet this standard. To 
begin with, it specifically identifies and incorporates by 
reference the provisions of each of the four contractual 
agreements entered into between DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and 
Defendant HOSPITAL which were attached as Exhibits to the 
Complaint. Therefore, all of those provisions may be referred 
to in deciding whether the Complaint adequately states any 
claims. Next, the Complaint quotes liberally from various 
provisions of those contracts. Included among such express 
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contractual provisions quoted in the Complaint are the 
following: 
1. H[I]t is in the mutual interest of the parties to 
obtain and retain satisfactory professional tenants in the New 
Office Building." (Complaint, Paragraph 1.8.) 
2. "Defendant HOSPITAL further covenated [sic] that it 
would 'actively assist the partnership in acquiring good tenants 
until such time as the New Office Building is completely 
occupied.'" (Complaint, Paragraph 19.) 
Continuing, in Paragraph 32, the Complaint notes that "at 
the present time, there are five office vacancies in Plaintiff's 
professional building and there are no reasonable sources of 
tenants to occupy the proposed facility to be build [sic] by 
Defendant Boyer Company without taking tenants from the building 
owned and operated by the Plaintiff." This allegation shows the 
failure of Defendant HOSPITAL to comply with its promises 
contained in the express contractual provisions quoted above to 
help obtain and keep satisfactory tenants in Plaintiff's 
buildings which obligation Defendant HOSPITAL clearly had, at 
least until the new building was completely occupied, which has 
never yet occurred. 
Then, the Complaint alleges in Paragraphs 33 through 35 
that the public announcement by Defendants of a new planned 
professional office building was done with the intent to 
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persuade present tenants of Plaintiff's buildings to avoid 
renewing their leases, that tenants have in fact notified 
Plaintiff that "they do not intend to renew their leases," and 
that at present, "there is no need for an additional 
professional building to service the needs of the doctors 
utilizing and practicing at the Defendant Hospital." These 
allegations support not only the first two causes of action for 
breach of contract, but also the third cause of action for 
tortious interference with prospective economic relations. 
Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY respectfully submits, 
without any more than what has been quoted eind described above, 
Plaintiff's Complaint is sufficient to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted for breach of express provisions of one or 
more of the contracts between Plaintiff and Defendant HOSPITAL. 
However, the Complaint of Plaintiff alleges much more. 
The Complaint notes in Paragraph 31 the contractual obligation 
of Defendant HOSPITAL "to act in good faith and deal with the 
Plaintiff fairly." The fact that every contract includes such a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing has been recognized by this 
Court at least since its decision in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
In addition, the Complaint notes many other provisions of 
the contracts between Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and 
Defendant HOSPITAL. These include at least the following: 
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1. The HOSPITAL'S repeated acknowledgment in Paragraph 
10.1 of both the original lease and the new replacement lease 
that "the parties mutually recognize that a building and 
operation as herein contemplated, located in close proximity to 
a hospital is essential to the success of the hospital. The 
recognition of this principle is reflected in the nominal rental 
required of Lessee hereunder." (Complaint, Paragraphs 10 and 
21.) 
2. The long-term nature of both leases, extending for 51 
years each with the possibility of two successive extensions of 
ten years each thereafter. (Complaint, Paragraphs 14 and 21.) 
3. Defendant HOSPITAL'S retained first right of refusal 
in the event of a proposed sale of the leased premises. 
(Complaint, Paragraphs 14 and 21.) 
4. Restrictions on the use of the leased premises, 
limiting occupancy to medical practitioners and a pharmacy which 
do not compete with the HOSPITAL. (Complaint, Paragraphs 11-13, 
21 and 23.) 
There are additional provisions of the documents, 
incorporated by reference in the Complaint, although not set 
forth verbatim in the Complaint, which also have a bearing on 
this issue. They include the following: 
A. The buildings would be constructed and maintained 
entirely at the expense of the lessee, Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT 
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COMPANY. (July 6, 1977 lease at Paragraph 5-4 and replacement 
lease at Paragraph 6.3.) 
B. The one-sided nature of the right to terminate the 
lease given only to Defendant HOSPITAL. (July 6, 1977 lease at 
Article VII and replacement lease at Article VIII.) 
Further, the Complaint addresses the course of dealing 
between the parties, not only the matters relating to building 
the second professional building, but also the timely and 
adequate performance thereafter. (Complaint at Paragraphs 27-
28.) 
Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY submits that these 
additional factors, taken together with the express contractual 
covenants of the HOSPITAL to get the new building completely 
filled with good tenants and have it continue in such status, 
result in an implied obligation of Defendant HOSPITAL that it 
not compete for those tenants, either directly or through a 
third-party, and if further expansion becomes necessary, that it 
offer Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY the opportunity to construct 
and operate any additional professional office space that might 
be needed by the HOSPITAL at its present location. 
Because of the location and design of Plaintiff's 
professional buildings, and the express restrictions on the 
types of permitted tenancies in the subject buildings, Plaintiff 
will not be able to find replacement tenants to fill its 
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buildings, thereby causing Plaintiff to lose considerable 
portions of its substantial investment mad^ in reliance on the 
long-term nature of its leases in constructing these buildings, 
unless the implied covenant not to compete directly or through 
another for the limited supply of tenants be recognized and 
enforced. Further additional damages, in the form of future 
lost profits to Plaintiff, will also be suffered without such 
recognition of the implied covenant not to compete. 
The further implied covenant to allow Plaintiff the first 
opportunity to provide any needed additional professional office 
space at HOSPITAL'S present location is also necessary to ensure 
that any such future construction on the Defendant's property 
not be undertaken that will improperly jeopardize the financial 
viability of Plaintiff's investment in its present buildings. 
The implied covenant described is necessary to prevent improper 
interference with Plaintiff's ability to obtain the return it 
justifiably expected and bargained for when it agreed to the 
terms of the leases. 
Defendant HOSPITAL insisted that Plaintiff's buildings not 
be used for commercial office space. Rather, to enhance its own 
ability to compete in the market of providing hospital 
facilities and services, Defendant HOSPITAL restricted the 
permitted tenancies in the buildings it sought from Plaintiff. 
Having obtained what it bargained for from Plaintiff, Defendant 
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HOSPITAL should likewise be required to allow Plaintiff to 
achieve its reasonable expectations flowing from their 
contracts. 
These conclusions are in accordance with the well-
recognized principle that "a contract need not provide for every 
collateral matter or possible contingency." Nixon & Nixon, 
Inc. v. John New & Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 
1982). This Court has long recognized that contracts can be 
implied from the conduct of parties where that conduct manifests 
mutual intent. Quality Performance Lines v. Yo Ho Automotive, 
Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1980). Since "parties are not 
ordinarily required to reasonably foresee that one will be 
negligent and injure the other, " Dubois v. Nye, 584 Po2d 823, 
825 (Utah 1978), Plaintiff DEVELOPMENT COMPANY certainly should 
not be precluded from the opportunity to show, with the aid of 
discovery, that the conduct and ongoing course of dealing of 
the parties, together with the various express provisions of 
their mutual agreements, and the course of dealing which 
prevailed for over 10 years, require that Defendant HOSPITAL at 
least refrain from diminishing the already severely limited pool 
of tenants permitted under the subject contracts and further 
give Plaintiff the first chance at constructing and maintaining 
additional buildings, if the need for such can be shown. 
However, since there is no denial properly before this Court of 
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Plaintiff's allegation that there is no present need for any 
additional professional office space adjacent to the HOSPITAL, 
this only reinforces the strength of Plaintiff's third cause of 
action for tortious interference with prospective economic 
relations• 
The types of claims made by Plaintiff in its Complaint are 
not novel. As Plaintiff pointed out in it$ Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
the Complaint, at pages 8 through 10 (Record at 132-134), courts 
have long recognized such causes of action in similar 
circumstances: Keating v. Preston, 42 Cal* App. 2d 110, 
108 P.2d 479 (1940) (trial court properly testrained lessor and 
its agents for renting other space in hotel to conduct a 
competing restaurant or similar food servide facility during the 
term of the lease of plaintiff); Belvedere Hotel Co. v. 
Williams, 137 Md. 665, 113 A. 335, 14 ALR 622 (Md. 1921) (hotel 
company enjoined from leasing room to a barber in violation of 
exclusive right given to earlier barber to operate in hotel); 
and, Carter v. Adler, 138 Cal. App. 2d 63, 291 P.2d 111 (Cal. 
App. 1955) (declaratory judgment holding tl^ at lessor was bound 
by implied obligation not to conduct a supermarket on an 
adjoining parcel so as to defeat the right of earlier lessees to 
conduct a supermarket.) 
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Similarly, Utah courts have recognized the tort of 
intentional interference with present and prospective economic 
relations for over seven years, as a supplement to breach of 
contract claims, where there the later claim is inadequate to 
providing a full measure of compensation for losses incurred as 
a result of the actionable conduct. Leigh Furniture and Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). In the present 
circumstances, if no injunctive relief is provided, Plaintiff's 
damages will include loss of future profits attributable to loss 
of current tenants even before Plaintiff's professional building 
has been fully occupied with "good tenants." 
Plaintiff submits that it has adequately, if not 
elegantly, stated a claim for tortious interference with current 
and future economic relations, particularly in light of the 
directives of Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that 
the claim be stated shortly and plainly (Rule 8(a)), that 
averments be "simple, concise and direct," without technical 
forms (Rule 8(e)), and that "pleadings shall be so construed as 
to do substantial justice" (Rule 8(f)). The Complaint alleges, 
in Paragraph 41, a willful deprivation of Plaintiff's rights by 
Defendants by virtue of their improper solicitations of 
Plaintiff's tenants in breach of the HOSPITAL'S contractual 
obligations to Plaintiff. This should be enough, for pleading 
purposes, to satisfy the requirement of improper means or 
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purpose. Cf.. Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift 
Corp., 525 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1974) (allegation that 
merchandise not as represented was sufficient to state claim for 
breach of warranty). Details of such allegations are best left 
to discovery. The Court's improper dismissal with prejudice of 
the breach of contract claims adversely affect Plaintiff's 
statement of the claim for tortious interference in the third 
cause of action, because the latter claim builds on and 
supplements the former. 
Moreover, some details of Defendants' conduct can only be 
had by discovery which has been frustrated by the dismissal of 
the Complaint by the lower court. Once sufch dismissal is 
vacated, and discovery allowed to proceed, the Complaint can be 
amended to better state the claims, if sucji is deemed necessary 
or desirable. Counsel for Plaintiff requested leave to amend, 
if found necessary, but was not given this opportunity, except 
as to the third cause of action (Transcript of hearing held 
August 30, 1989, at pp. 14, 25 and 35; Record at 218, 229 and 
239). Courts often encourage amendment rather than dismissal in 
similar circumstances. See, Thomas J. Peclf & Sons, Inc. v. Lee 
Rock Products, Inc., 
30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-450 (1973) ("The pleadings 
are never more important than the cause th^t is before the court 
. . . . There can be no prejudice in this case because we'll 
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give ample time for any answer . . . . " ) . £f. Gill v. Timm, 
720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986) (meagerly stated complaint 
adequate "to inform defendant of the plain nature and basis of 
the claim against him" and procedure of amendment of pleadings 
to conform with trial evidence "much preferred to alternative of 
dismissal . . . . ") . 
The lower court's failure to accept the Complaint as 
stated may be partially explained by its apparently having 
accepted certain factual contentions improperly advanced by 
counsel for Defendants. First, counsel for Defendants argued 
that there were no express provisions of the contractual 
agreements breached. (Transcript of hearing held August 30,1989 
at pp. 3, 5 and 9; Record at 207, 209 and 213). This ignored 
the express contractual provisions noted above. Second, the 
Court noted at page 35 of the transcript of the hearing held 
August 30, 1989, that Plaintiff was "sophisticated." The only 
apparent basis for this characterization is the unsupported 
factual contention by counsel for Defendants that the subject 
contracts were drawn by or with the advice and approval of 
lawyers for the parties. E.g.. Transcript at pp. 8, 9; Record 
at 212, 213. 
Under the present circumstances, Plaintiff submits that it 
was an abuse of discretion by the lower court not to allow 
amendment, if needed. Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 
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1009 (Ut. App. 1989) (motion to dismiss, filed before any 
answer, is not a responsive pleading precluding amendment of 
complaint as a matter of course under Rule 15(a) of the 
Ut. R. Civ. P.)? See also, Bonneville Towey Condominium 
Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728 
P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986); Intermountain Physical Medicine 
Associates v. Micro-dex Corporation, 739 Pf2d 1131 (Ut. App. 
1987). 
Accordingly, this Court should find ^hat Plaintiff 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY has adequately stated cplaims for relief in 
its Complaint. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED ADEQUATELY TO CONSIDER THE 
HOSPITAL'S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
As earlier noted herein, all Utah contracts require the 
parties thereto to use good faith and fair dealing in their 
relations with other parties. Beck, 701 P.2d 795. In the 
insurance context presented in that case, t^ his Court was clear 
that a violation of that duty gives rise tp a claim for breach 
of contract, id. at 798. 
In at least one other context, where there was argument as 
to whether or not a contract between the parties even existed, 
this Court has recognized causes of action sounding in breach of 
contract and tort, respectively, for the alleged breach of a 
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bank's duty to act in good faith and exercise ordinary care in 
handling all banking transactions. Arrow Industries, Inc, v. 
Zions First National Bank, 761 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). In Arrow, 
the bank was alleged to have breached this duty by the manner in 
which it handled checks that had been left with it for 
collection after the checks had earlier been dishonored for lack 
of funds in the account of the bank's depositor. While this 
opinion was founded to some extent on the existence of certain 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, this Court also 
noted that recognition of the duty to act in good faith and 
exercise ordinary care "appeals to our sense of reason and 
fairness . . . . •• Id., 767 P. 2d at 938. 
Plaintiff is mindful that a majority of this Court has not 
yet seen fit to recognize a cause of action for breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of claims 
alleging unlawful termination of contracts of employment, 
apparently largely due to the long-settled reliance of employers 
on the doctrine of employment-at-will. Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); and Caldwell v. Ford, 
Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989). 
However, in the present case before the Court, there is 
not the same sort of reliance on a long-recognized doctrine such 
as the employment-at-will doctrine. Instead, we are presented 
with the narrow situation of a contractor having been persuaded 
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to agree to build, at significant expense, at least two 
professional buildings in a location and wJLth restrictions on 
tenancy that severely limit the potential pool of tenants for 
these buildings, all in reliance on the HOSPITAL'S promise, both 
express and implied, to cooperate in securing and keeping 
suitable tenants throughout the term of this LEASE lasting at 
least 51 years. Surely this situation is much more akin to that 
presented in Beck, 701 P.2d 795, and warrants recognition of a 
cause of action for breach of contract for the failure to use 
good faith and fair dealing. 
Plaintiff is also aware, as this Coujpt has noted, that a 
breach of an implied covenant to act in goQd faith does not, 
alone, give rise to a cause of action in t<Jrt. Gagon v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 771 >^.2d 325 (Utah 1988). 
However, this Court has also held that, "ih some cases, the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also result in breaches of 
duty that are independent of the contract $nd may give rise to 
causes of action in tort." Beck, 701 P.2d at 800, footnote 3. 
Plaintiff submits that it is therefore appropriate to 
consider the nature and extent of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, along with other factors, in deciding whether a 
cause of action for tortious interference ^ith prospective 
economic relations has been stated. 
-29-
In fact, in the case in which this Court first recognized 
the cause of action for tortious interference with prospective 
economic relations, this Court noted that some of the isolated 
interferences presented there, which collectively satisfied the 
elements of that tort, considered alone might also give rise to 
"a cause of action for breach of specific provisions in the 
contract or of the duty of good faith performance which inhere 
is in every contractual relation." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 
306. Accordingly, in the present case, the alleged breaches of 
the HOSPITAL'S express and implied promises, including its 
violation of its duty of good faith and fair dealing, are 
properly considered in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a 
claim for tortious interference with economic relations. 
Plaintiff submits that it has sufficiently stated such a claim, 
and urges this Court to so determine. 
CONCLUSION 
The Complaint of Plaintiff is sufficient to state claims 
on which relief can be granted for breach of contract and for 
tortious interference with economic relations. The lower court 
erred in dismissing the Complaint, particularly in dismissing 
the first two causes of action thereof with prejudice. The 
Order of the lower court dismissing the Complaint should be 
vacated, and Defendants should be required to answer the 
Complaint and respond to the discovery served on them. 
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At all events, the Order of the Couft dismissing the first 
two causes of action with prejudice should be reversed and 
Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the Complaint in its 
entirety. i 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IL> day of January, 1990. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Arthur^  H. Nielsen ^ 
John K. Mangum 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & 
Tower 
60 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Recorded Book . _#. 
Pa9e -...IBil 
Indexed . 
THOMAS L. KAY (A1778) and 
STEVEN J. AESCHBACHER (A4527) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
St. Benedict's Hospital 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ST. BENEDICT'S DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a general partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL, a 
Utah non-profit corporation, 
and THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
O R D E R 
SEP 2 9 1989 
Civil No. 890902631 
Judge David E. Roth 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
The Motions to Dismiss of defendants St. Benedict's 
Hospital and The Boyer Company came on for hearing before the 
Honorable David Roth on August 30, 1989, with plaintiff represented 
by Arthur H. Nielsen and John K. Mangum, defendant St. Benedict's 
Hospital represented by Thomas L. Kay and Steven J. Aeschbacher, 
and defendant The Boyer Company represented by Richard D. Burbidge 
and Stephen B. Mitchell. 
J Recorded Book -
 v 
!Xr:«4'*.| 
After reviewing the pleadings, lega|l memoranda, and hearing 
the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, 
the Court determines as a matter of law that the contracts and 
lease agreements attached to plaintiff's Complaint do not contain 
any express covenant restricting St. Benedict's Hospital from building 
a professional office building on its land anc£. that no such covenant 
can be implied. Based upon the foregoing, and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The Motions to Dismiss of St. Benedict's Hospital 
and The Boyer Company are granted and plaintiff's Complaint is 
dismissed; 
2. The First and Second Causes of Ajction of plaintiff's 
Complaint are dismissed with prejudice; and 
3. The Third Cause of Action of plaintiff's Complaint 
is dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this <^> day of September, 19$9. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
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